Full-pace, full-scope testing of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle prototypes began Sept. 3 and could last for 14 months.
Each of the 3 vendors — Oshkosh Defense, Lockheed Martin and AM General — delivered 22 vehicles and 6 trailers for testing to 3 sites — Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; Yuma, Ariz.; and Redstone Arsenal, Ala.
Rigorous reliability testing over various terrains and in several climatic conditions and protection-related testing is being conducted, said Col. John Cavedo, the Joint Program Office manager, who spoke Sept. 4, during a JLTV webcast.
The program continues to be on course despite this year’s sequestration and the continuation of constant resolutions, but when budget issues aren’t resolved by next year, Cavedo said he couldn’t rule out a slip within the schedule.
“We’re doing everything we will to maintain this system on the right track,” he said, emphasizing the significance of this system to meeting asymmetrical threats like those experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CLOSING CAPABILITIES GAP
Cavedo related an incident years ago on the Fulda Gap at the East-West German border.
“My company commander pointed to the northeast and told me ‘that’s where the enemy will come from,’ after which rotated and said, ‘that’s the secure area within the rear where the friendly forces should be.’”
During Cold-War-era exercises, Humvees safely moved in regards to the rear area while tanks and other heavily armored vehicles would maneuver within the battle space. The Fulda Gap was considered by many to be the right line of approach for Soviet tanks moving west and south.
That notion of front lines and rear area was not applicable after 9/11, he said. Humvees became at risk of improvised explosive devices regardless of where they were. Up-armor was added for defense however the enemy adapted to that with more lethal explosives.
The added weight of the up-armor taxed the Humvees’ performance and extra limited its payload, which now included network gear. And, the Humvees were just aging, with the 1st ones rolling off the assembly line about three decades ago.
Soldiers and Marines continued to be vulnerable, so the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles, referred to as MRAPs, were developed. These had good payload and protection and helped save many lives during the last six years, but performance was sacrificed and Soldiers couldn’t move with speed and agility across the battlefield, especially within the difficult terrain in parts of Afghanistan, he said.
Furthermore, the heavier versions of the sooner MRAPs couldn’t be moved across the battlefield by helicopter and required strategic lift, which in turn required adequate runways for these big cargo planes to take-off and land.
The sustainment cost for the MRAP program increased over the years, he said, as more variants were developed by different vendors. Parts weren’t interchangeable and mechanics needed to get follow-on training, he said.
The JLTV closed the aptitude gap, addressing “the iron-triangle of payload, performance and protection,” he said. Its payload and protection has similarities to an MRAP and its performance exceeds that of a Humvee.
ADAPTABILITY & FLEXIBILITY
Besides addressing the “iron-triangle,” Cavedo said the JLTV is designed to fulfill the desires of the commander for various missions.
The commander can decide what level of protection JLTV needs for the mission, he said, declaring that armor kits would be available for vehicles going into harm’s way. Also, a number of the JLTVs would be equipped with heavy weapons, including TOW missile systems, while others can be utilized as light, utility vehicles.
Other kits include command and control and network gear. He said JLTV “plug and play” open-architecture technology permits future networks and electronic devices to be installed and not using a vehicle redesign.
While different vehicles may have different kits, all vehicles come equipped with automatic fire extinguishers, multiple egress options, fuel-tank fire suppression systems and combat locks.
Powering the 21,000-pound gross weight JLTV and whatever kits and trailers are added on is a 300-horsepower fuel-efficient diesel engine. JLTVs will also manage to tow the thousands of legacy trailers which are still useable.
HOLDING COSTS DOWN
“We’ve managed to carry cost down by promoting better competition between vendors, incentivizing productivity and conducting an analysis of alternatives,” he said. By “analysis of alternatives,” he means ordering the proper selection of kits and mission packages. “We don’t want surplus kits stockpiled in warehouses around the country.”
Incentivizing productivity, he explained, suggests that after giving the unique equipment manufacturer, or OEM, the specs, like protection, speed, weight and the like, it’s as much as them to establish how it’s built and what the tradeoffs are.
He provided an example. Besides armor kits, the fundamental JLTV requires a definite level of protection, he said. There could possibly be very exotic metals accessible which are lightweight and offer exceptional protection, however the cost involved can be astronomical. So a tradeoff may very well be reached where steel or aluminum is used to maintain the pricetag down but still meet the elemental requirements. To be competitive, however, the thickness or kind of material used might exceed basic standards but be within an inexpensive budget.
Tradeoffs like this apply to the facility and transmission features and to everything else at the vehicle, he said. They’re attempting to be as innovative and competitive as possible with the opposite OEMs, yet they ought to stay below the $250,000 assembly-line figure.
There are alternative ways cost have been controlled. As opposed to requiring each OEM to offer 35 vehicles, they were required to offer 22 for the testing phase, he said. That number is cheap and adequate for an excellent evaluation.
Also, other than a price-plus type contract, the JLTV is on a company-fixed price contract.
“In the past, the production price was set after down-select,” he said. “Our intent was to set production prices during competition in order we go forward into the competitive down-select we’ll have production prices set at that time and never negotiated for the years out.”
TIMELINE
Source-selection evaluation will start in early 2015, and conclude by July of that year when a single vendor would be selected.
At that point, 2,000 vehicles might be produced and be tested for 3 years with the focal point on fine-tuning the assembly line, full-up system testing etc.
Full-scale production will begin in fiscal year 2018 with the ratio of organic to contract work determined by the third quarter of fiscal year 2015.
By 2018, the primary Army brigade will roll with new JLTVs, he said.
Production will total 49,000 JLTVs for the military and 5,500 for the Marines, with the production cycle ending sometime within the 2030s.
Kits will initially be produced by the chosen OEM but follow-on kits might use a unique vendor, he said.
In conclusion, Cavedo said the JLTV comes on the right time on the right cost, and is one of the best match to the Army’s shift to the Pacific, regional alignment strategy and meets the necessities of the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 and the Army’s 2014 Equipment Modernization Plan.
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